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I. FICTIONAL CHARACTERS AND THE LAW
After 127 years of providing detective consulting services, in
2014, Sherlock Holmes faced his toughest case yet: “The Mystery
of the Public Domain.” In that case, the Seventh Circuit was asked
to balance the competing interests of the estate of the Sherlock
Holmes creator with the interests of authors to use the character in
new fictional works.1 Utilizing the existing body of case law on the
subject, the court deduced that Arthur Conan Doyle and his estate
had exploited the Holmes character as far as copyright law allows,
setting Holmes up for new adventures in the public domain.2
American intellectual property law is designed to incentivize
authors to create new literary, artistic, and other works of
authorship; and thus add to America’s rich and ever-growing
popular culture. To achieve this objective, copyright law, and in
fact, the Constitution, affords authors certain exclusive rights in
their copyrighted works, including to the original characters
contained therein, so that the authors can secure a fair return on
their efforts.3 At the same time, the law limits a character owner’s
monopoly by (i) limiting the protection afforded to characters to
only those that are fully developed; (ii) allowing others to create
and exploit similar, but non-infringing, characters that share
common traits and stock or genre characteristics; (iii) permitting
third parties to make fair uses of characters; and (iv) ensuring that
the copyright in protected characters will eventually expire,
injecting such characters into the public domain. While character
owners have an assortment of legal tools available to protect their
work, these legal tools are not absolute; the public can utilize
characters owned by others without the need to secure rights from
the owners by way of devices like the fair use doctrine and free
speech rights.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 503.
3
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2
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Character owners and new creators should familiarize
themselves with the legal protections afforded to fictional
characters. To best exploit and protect a character over time,
character creators should consider legal protections while
conceiving and designing characters. New creators should
understand how existing characters might impact their ability to
create and exploit new ones that are similar to, or reminiscent of,
those existing characters. On the other hand, creators and owners
of existing characters should be aware of the limits on their
exclusive rights, so that they can avoid wasting energy and
resources taking meritless actions against perceived infringers.
This article explains the legal protections available to
characters, and the limitations on character owners’ exclusive
rights. Part II provides an overview of the laws available to protect
fictional characters. Sections III through V examine specific
examples of how various laws have been applied to fictional
characters. Section VI addresses the limitations on character
owners’ rights, and explores the ways in which characters or their
constituent elements may be freely used without permission.
Finally, section VII offers tips on protecting characters within
existing legal parameters.
II. LEGAL BASIS FOR PROTECTING CHARACTERS
Copyright law provides exclusive rights for creative works,
including fictional characters that are (1) original, and (2) fixed in
a tangible medium.4 Cases construing the meaning of “originality”
generally have required it to mean “independent creation plus a
modicum of creativity.”5 The creativity bar is not high.6 Moreover,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); see Balt. Orioles v. Major League Baseball
Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing the statutory
definition of “fixed” in 17 U.S.C. § 101).
5
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991).
6
See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Balt. Orioles, 805 F. 2d at 669
n.7; L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F. 2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976) (“[T]he
quantum of originality that is required may be modest indeed . . . .”).
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while “some original expression” is required, the original
expression contributed to a work need not be separable from the
work as a whole.7
The goal of copyright is to promote the progress of the arts8
and consequently enrich the public.9 This goal is accomplished by
giving creators an incentive to create by allowing them certain
exclusive rights for limited periods of time.10 By limiting the
duration of copyright,11 the public’s interest in an ever-growing,
rich public domain is balanced with the interests of creators. By
affording copyright owners protection in their works, copyright
law also benefits the public by encouraging authors to produce
original works. It is not designed to let creators avoid “the
drudgery of working up something fresh” by simply copying
existing works.12
Trademark law protects any word, name, symbol, or device
that is used to identify the source or origin of a product.13 Thus, to
the extent that any character indicia function to identify the source
or origin of a product or service, such character indicia may be
entitled to trademark protection.14 While exclusive trademark
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7

Gaiman v. MacFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 658 (7th Cir. 2004).
U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
9
See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889 (2012); Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Mazur v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
10
See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 902 (citing Sony Corp. and Mazur in support of
the proposition that the limited copyright conferred by copyright is meant to
motivate authors to create).
11
17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
12
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994).
13
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
14
See Sony v. Fireworks, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(holding that where plaintiffs could not define to what they were claiming
trademark rights, nor that the character had acquired secondary meaning as a
source identifier, the court could not assess whether there was a likelihood of
confusion between plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks to find trademark
infringement by the defendants), vacated, 2002 WL 32387901 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
8

!
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rights protect owners by encouraging them to invest in the
goodwill attendant with their marks, trademark law is rooted in
consumer protection.15 Just as consumers buy any trademarked
goods based on the goodwill of the applicable trademark, the
public consumes entertainment products based on the brands
associated with such products.
The goal of trademark law is to protect “the purchasing public
from confusing desired product with similarly named, labeled, or
branded product from a different source.”16 Trademark law also
gives trademark owners the incentive to invest in the establishment
of brand names and marks, and to maintain high levels of quality
control over their products and services.17 Trademark law can thus
“contribute to a favorable climate for expression by complementing
the economic incentive that copyright provides to create and
disseminate artistic works.”18 Unlike copyright, trademark rights
may persist indefinitely as long as the trademark owner continues
to use its mark. However, merely registering an image of a
character as a trademark does not give the registrant perpetual
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Where a character, or its name, is not inherently distinctive, and it is not
otherwise protected as a registered trademark, it may still be entitled to
trademark protection if it has acquired “secondary meaning” such that the
consuming public would associate any third party’s use of those elements with
the source or origin of the entertainment property from which those elements
were derived. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 1979).
15
James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 276 (7th
Cir. 1976) (“The trademark laws exist not to ‘protect’ trademarks, but. . . to
protect the consuming public from confusion, concomitantly protecting the
trademark owner’s right to a non-confused public.”).
16
Mechanical Plastics Corp. v. Titan Techs., Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1137, 1143
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
17
Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir
1985); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Freuhauf, 536 F.2d. 1210, 1215 (8th Cir.
1976).
18
Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 48 (2d Cir. 1989).
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rights in the image.19 It is not the recognition of a character image
that provides perpetual rights in that image. Rather, it is the
character owner’s continued use of that image as a source identifier
that allows the image to receive trademark protection indefinitely.20
Copyright protection in a character, in contrast, continues for the
duration of the copyright term regardless of whether the copyright
owner continues to exploit the work. Copyright owners can let
their works go out of print or elect not to publish or license any
third parties to publish any new works using a character, and still
preserve copyright protection for that character. Trademark law, on
the other hand, requires that a trademark owner continually convey
its character to the public to maintain trademark rights in that
character.
Another proprietary right that may protect characters from
unauthorized use is the right of publicity. Every person, whether
famous or not, has a property right in her name and likeness. Some
people become famous because of characters they portray or
personas they adopt, and the name and likeness of that character or
persona can have substantial value. Unlike copyright and
trademark law, rights of publicity are state-based (both statutory
and common law), and therefore not uniform throughout the
country. Generally, the laws prohibit the unauthorized use of a
person’s name or likeness for commercial purposes.21 As opposed
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19

See In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d. 1042, 1052 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies,
J., concurring).
20
See id. at 1052.
21
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995) (“One who
appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using without
consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of
trade is subject to liability . . . .”); Id. § 47 (1995) (“The name, likeness, and
other indicia of a person’s identity are used “for purposes of trade” . . . . if they
are used in advertising the user’s goods or services, or are placed on
merchandise marketed by the user, or are used in connection with services
rendered by the user. However, use “for purposes of trade” does not ordinarily
include the use of a person’s identity in news reporting, commentary,

!
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to the right of privacy, which protects a person’s feelings, a
person’s right of publicity gives the exclusive right to control the
commercial exploitation of her name and likeness.22 Often invoked
as a complement to trademark rights, right of publicity laws have
been used by individuals to prohibit others from commercially
exploiting characters or personas that they portray. Moreover, right
of publicity claims will not be preempted by copyright or
trademark laws if such claims address rights different from those
protected by copyright and trademark, such as persona or
likeness.23
III. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF CHARACTERS
Copyright provides exclusive protection for original works of
authorship fixed in a tangible medium.24 The law does not grant a
monopoly over mere ideas, themes, or concepts; which are in the
public domain and available to everyone.25 In order to gain
exclusive copyright in a character, character creators must not only
create original works, but must also flesh out their characters with
enough original expression to make them distinctive.26 Courts have
therefore developed tests to determine whether a character has
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in advertising that is incidental
to such uses.”).
22
Haelan Lab. Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d
Cir. 1953) (recognizing property right in a baseball player’s photograph used on
trading cards).
23
See Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., Nos. 93-56318, 93-56510, 1995 WL
115571, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 1995).
24
17 U.S.C. §102 (2012) (corresponding to the language of the Copyright
Act of 1909 Act, § 3) (“That the copyright provided by this title shall protect all
the copyrightable component parts of the work copyrighted . . . .”).
25
Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526 (9th Cir.
1992) (explaining that copyright does not confer a monopoly over the
underlying idea or functional principle, as that is the domain under the more
stringent standards imposed by patent laws).
26
See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).

!
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reached a level of distinction to grant exclusive rights to the unique
compilation of the character’s traits.
In the 1930 case of Nichols v. Universal Pictures, the Ninth
Circuit employed the now oft-cited “sufficiently delineated” test.27
Pursuant to this test, if an author has imbued the character with
sufficient original details, the character will be entitled to some
level of protection.28 The more highly developed the character, the
greater the protection available. In Nichols, the court found that the
plaintiff’s characters were not sufficiently developed and thus not
copyrightable because they were merely archetypal characters that
often appeared in literature.29 In his opinion, Judge Learned Hand
warned would-be plaintiffs that “[t]he less developed a character in
a play is, the less it can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an
author must bear for marking them too indistinctly.”30
Another well-known judicial test for the copyrightability of
characters is the “story being told” test that originated in the
Second Circuit in 1954. In Warner Bros. v. Columbia Broadcast
Systems, the court found that a character could only be the subject
of copyright protection where the character constituted “the story
being told.”31 Pursuant to this test, the character must be more than
a “mere vehicle” for the telling of the story, and must actually be
the “story being told.”32 Taking a more restrictive view of the
copyrightability of a character apart from the work in which he
appears, the court here reasoned that because “[t]he characters of
an author’s imagination and the art of his descriptive talent . . . are
always limited and always fall into limited patterns,” allowing one
author to claim a monopoly over that character would violate
copyright law’s goal of promoting the useful arts unless the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27

See id. at 121.
Id.
29
Id. at 122–23.
30
Id. at 121.
31
See 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954).
32
Id.
28
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character constitutes the story.33 In that case the court found that
Sam Spade was merely the vehicle for telling the The Maltese
Falcon story, and thus not copyrightable.34
Most courts have declined to follow Warner Brothers,
suggesting that the proposed “story being told” test was dictum.35
Others have reasoned that while the “story being told” test may
apply to literary characters, it is inapplicable to visual characters.36
Still others have held that, if the test was ever good law, it is no
longer.37 Other courts have applied elements from each of the
foregoing tests, looking both at how developed a character is, and
the character’s role in the work in which it appears.38 In Anderson
v. Stallone, the court held that the characters from the first three
films from the Rocky motion picture series were among “the most
highly delineated characters in modern American cinema, and
were so highly developed and central to the films that they
constituted the story being told.”39 A few years later, in MetroGoldwyn-Mayer v. American Honda, the same court found that the
James Bond character was both sufficiently delineated and the
story being told throughout the sixteen films in which he had
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33

Id. at 950.
Id. In that case, the holding that the character was not protectable under
copyright law actually favored the character’s creator who wished to use the
character in new works after granting exclusive rights to the work in which the
character first appeared to a movie studio. Id.
35
See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978);
Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1165(C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989).
36
See Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004); Walt Disney
Prods., 581 F.2d at 755; Anderson, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d, at 1165.
37
Anderson, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d, at 1165 (“Subsequent decisions in the Ninth
Circuit cast doubt on the reasoning and implicitly limit the holding of the Sam
Spade case.”); Gaiman at 660 (“The Ninth Circuit has killed the decision,
though without the usual obsequies.”).
38
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. American Honda, 900 F. Supp. 1287 (C.D.
Cal. 1995); Anderson, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d, at 1166.
39
Anderson, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d, at 1166 (emphasis added).
34
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appeared, such that the character was deserving of copyright
protection.40
A. Literary Characters Versus Visual Characters
Not all characters qualify for copyright protection, and not all
characters are treated equally under the law. Pursuant to any
judicial test, characters lacking distinctive, original traits or an
original combination of distinctive traits have been found to be
uncopyrightable.41 Also, while purely literary characters might be
protectable, visual characters (such as comic or cartoon characters)
are easier to protect, as their visual embodiments are entitled to
protection independent of their literary attributes. This is not to say
that characters developed solely by “word portraits”42 are not
entitled to protection. They certainly are, but identifying the
protectable elements of purely literary characters presents
challenges not applicable to visual characters.43 In a recent Seventh
Circuit case, the court was asked to consider all the protectable
traits of the Sherlock Holmes and John Watson characters from an
entire series of books and stories.44 It found that those characters
were distinctive enough to be proper subjects of copyright
independent of the stories in which they appeared.45 While
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 900 F. Supp. at 1296.
See Olson v. National Broad. Co., 855 F. 2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1988).
42
1 MELVIN NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.12 (Matthew Bender rev.
ed. 2014).
43
See Anderson, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d, at 1165 (“As a practical matter, a
graphically depicted character is much more likely than a literary character to be
fleshed out in sufficient detail so as to warrant copyright protection.”); Walt
Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1978) (“While many
literary characters may embody little more than an unprotected idea… a comic
book character, which has physical as well as conceptual qualities, is more likely
to contain some unique elements of expression.”).
44
Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 2014)
(“From the outset of the series of Arthur Conan Doyle stories and novels that
began in 1887 Holmes and Watson were distinctive characters and therefore
copyrightable.”).
45
Id.
41
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multiple appearances may aid in the development of the character,
they are not required for a court to find that a literary character is
developed enough to be copyrightable. A district court in Washington
had no difficulty in concluding that an anthropomorphized seagull
appearing in one book was both sufficiently delineated and the
story being told, and therefore copyrightable.46 But characters
lacking visual depiction that are only described in a few lines will
likely not be developed enough to be copyrightable.47
In the case where a character is solely described in writing, the
reader must necessarily use imagination to create a vision of the
character in the mind. Each reader therefore could have a different
interpretation of the elements combined to create the character,
making it difficult to define what makes the character developed.
Where a character has a visual representation, however, all viewers
receive a uniform interpretation of the character.48 The Ninth
Circuit in Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates asserted that
visual characters should not be subject to the Second Circuit’s
stringent test applicable to literary characters.49 It reasoned that the
physical and conceptual qualities of a comic book character,
apparent through its visual representation, are more likely to be a
unique expression.50 The court then held that Disney’s famous
graphic characters were protected by copyright and infringed by
the defendants when they placed the innocent characters in “adult”
situations.51
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46

Bach v. Forever Living Prods. U.S., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (W.D.
Wash. 2007). C.f. Rice v. Fox, 330 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he
magician is dressed in standard magician garb—black tuxedo with tails, a white
tuxedo shirt, a black bow tie, and a black cape with red lining—and his role is
limited to performing and revealing the magic tricks.”).
47
See Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 855 F. 2d 1446, 1452–53 (9th Cir. 1988).
48
See Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644 at 660–61 (7th Cir. 2004).
49
581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
50
Id. at 755.
51
Id. at 755–56
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The court in Anderson v. Stallone found that the defendant’s
script treatment for a fourth Rocky film was a “bodily
appropriation” of the characters portrayed in the first three Rocky
films—and an infringement.52 In its opinion, the court evaluated
the judicial tests for copyrightability of characters and noted that
"[a]s a practical matter, a graphically depicted character is much
more likely than a literary character to be fleshed out in sufficient
detail so as to warrant copyright protection."53 Reasoning that the
detail with which the characters were developed in the first three
films delineated the characters more than sufficiently, and that the
characters—as opposed to the plots—are what drove the three
Rocky films, the court found the Rocky characters copyrightable
under both tests.54 Similarly, the court in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v.
American Honda had to determine whether James Bond was a
copyrightable character separate from the works in which he
appeared.55 Noting that the law in the Ninth Circuit was unclear as
to which test should be applied to a visual character such as James
Bond, the court elected to analyze the copyrightability of Bond
under both tests.56 Because the character as portrayed in each of
plaintiffs’ sixteen Bond movies displayed such specific traits—“his
cold-bloodedness; his overt sexuality; his love of martinis ‘shaken,
not stirred;’ his marksmanship; his ‘license to kill’ . . . .”—James
Bond was more than sufficiently delineated.57 Moreover, because
these character traits remained consistent throughout the sixteen

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52

Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d, at 1166 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
Id.
54
Id. at 1174.
55
900 F. Supp. 1287 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
56
Id. at 1296–97.
57
Id. at 1296; see also Toho Co. v. William Morrow & Co. 33 F. Supp. 2d
1206, 1216 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“Toho’s Godzilla is a well-defined character with
highly delineated consistent traits. Therefore, Toho has demonstrated prima
facie ownership of copyrights in the Godzilla character apart from any film.”).
53
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films even though the character was played by multiple actors, the
stories really were about the James Bond character.58
B. Component Parts of Characters Can Be Separately
Copyrightable
While the collection of specific traits of a character can be
copyrightable, original, individual components of a character’s
identity may also be protected by copyright. In New Line Cinema
v. Russ Berrie, the court found that the glove worn by Freddy
Krueger in the Nightmare on Elm Street films was protectable by
copyright on its own.59 The court in that case opined that where the
component part of a character protected by copyright so helps to
identify the character, that part, even when separated from the rest
of the character, remains protected by copyright.60 Recently, a
court held that the Batmobile was a copyrighted character.61 In DC
Comics v. Towle, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that
the Batmobile is not protectable by copyright because it is a useful
item—a car—holding on alternative bases that: (1) the Batmobile
is a copyrighted character because it displays “a series of readily
identifiable and distinguishing traits . . . [it is] recognizable
because it contains bat-like motifs, such as a bat-faced grill or batshaped tailfins in the rear of the car, and it is almost always jet
black;”62 and (2) the separately identifiable creative elements
incorporated into the Batmobile that are capable of existing
independently from the utilitarian aspects of the car are protectable
as pictorial, graphic and sculptural works.63 The original,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58

See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer, 900 F. Supp. at 1296; see also William
Morrow & Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1216 (“While Godzilla may have shifted from
evil to good, there remains an underlying set of attributes that remain in every
film.”).
59
161 F. Supp. 2d 293, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
60
Id.
61
DC Comics v. Towle, 989 F. Supp. 2d 948 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
62
Id. at 967.
63
Id. at 968.
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consistent features of the design of the car are what make it
recognizable as a character.
C. Stock Characters Are Not Copyrightable
Characters lacking originality, however, will not be protected
by copyright. Stock characters, archetypes, and characters lacking
unique expression, cannot be monopolized under copyright law.64
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. described the “spectrum” of
copyright protection for characters.65 On one end are scènes à
faire:66 “stock scenes and hackneyed character types,” which are
not protectable because they contain no unique aspects.67 However,
as characters become more idiosyncratic, they eventually cross the
line into “expression” and are protected by copyright.68 A character
that in its early stages was merely a stock character can be fleshed
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64

See e.g., DiTocco v. Riordan, 815 F. Supp. 2d 655, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(“Young male heroes who must cope with missing parents and display their
strength in battles with otherworldly forces are commonplace.”). For further
examples of characters which are not protected, see Walker v. Time Life Films,
Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that scènes à faire, which have
been described as “scenes that necessarily result from the choice of a setting or
situation” are not copyrightable.); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618
F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980) (providing more examples of scènes à faire such as
“incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter indispensable,
or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic”) (internal quotation
omitted); Reyher v. Children’s Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir.
1976) (holding that “thematic concepts . . . which necessarily must follow from
certain similar plot situations” are not copyrightable).
65
268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
66
French translation for “scenes of action.” See also BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (“Standard or general themes that are common to a
wide variety of works and therefore not copyrightable.”).
67
Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1266.
68
Id. (internal quotation omitted); see also Sid & Marty Krofft Prod., Inc. v.
McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 1977) (Explaining that there
is no infringement if only the ideas from a work are copied because ideas
receive no copyright protection. “To constitute infringement the copying must
reach the point of ‘unlawful appropriation,’ or the copying of the protected
expression itself.”).
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out enough to bring it into “copyright land.”69 Once the character
embodies an “original arrangement of incidents and literary
expressions,” and does not merely describe a type of character, the
character may be protected by copyright.70 In Detective Comics v.
Bruns, the court acknowledged that copyright does not extend to
“archetypal” elements such as the idea or premise of a “Superman”
who is a blessing to mankind. But while the underlying premise for
the “benevolent Hercules” type character is not protectable, other
elements, such as incredible feats, characterizations (such as
employment and secret identities), and unique antics are.71
IV. PROTECTION OF CHARACTERS THROUGH TRADEMARK RIGHTS
A. Trademark Rights Are Separate from Copyrights
Because trademark and copyright principles apply to and
protect different aspects of a creative work and are not mutually
dependent, trademark rights in a character may be owned and
enforced even if the trademark owner does not own the copyright
in the character.72 For example, in Tri-star Pictures, Inc. v. Del
Taco, Inc., even though the plaintiff did not own any copyrights in
the “Zorro” character, it was not barred from bringing a trademark
infringement claim when the defendant sought to use Zorro-related
indicia to promote its restaurant chain.73 Trademark law offers
character owners protections independent of copyright law, which
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69

Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004).
Detective Comics v. Bruns Publ’ns, 111 F.2d 432, 433–34 (2d Cir. 1940);
see Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 659 (discussing the court’s analysis in the Detective
Comics case). The author’s verbal description of a comic book character is an
uncopyrightable stock character. Id. at 661. However, once the character is
“drawn and named and given speech, he be[comes] sufficiently delineated to be
copyrightable.” Id.
71
See id. at 433–34.
72
See, e.g., Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1989); Fleischer
Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1153–54 (C.D. Cal.
2008), aff’d, 654 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2011); Tri-star Pictures, Inc. v. Del Taco,
Inc., 1999 WL 33260839 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
73
See Tri-star, 1999 WL 33260839, at *2–4.
70
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can be exercised by the owner of a character notwithstanding that
any copyright in the character may have expired.74
B. Character Elements Must Act as Source Identifiers
Just as copyright law does not protect all elements of a
character, not all character elements are protectable by trademark
law. Only those elements of a character that assist the public in
associating the character with a specific source may receive
trademark protection.75 A character’s name may be a protectable
component of a character under trademark law.76 In Wyatt Earp
Enterprises, Inc. v. Sackman, Inc., the court held that the plaintiff
had established secondary meaning and hence trademark rights in
the “Wyatt Earp” name even though Wyatt Earp was a real person
of historic significance.77 The court recognized that the
commercial value of the character’s name was attributable almost
entirely to a television program produced by the plaintiff along
with the plaintiff’s extensive licensing program, which “battered
[the name] into the public consciousness.”78 The secondary
meaning in the Wyatt Earp name generated by the plaintiff’s use of
the name allowed the plaintiff to stop the licensee from selling and
promoting Wyatt Earp costumes after its license had expired.79 The
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74

Id. at *3–4. See generally Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc. v. Fireworks Entm’t
Grp., Inc., 137 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
75
DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Assocs., 486 F. Supp. 1273, 1277
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“[W]here the product sold by plaintiff is ‘entertainment’ in
one form or another, then not only the advertising of the product but also an
ingredient of the product itself can amount to a trademark protectable under §
43(a) because the ingredient can come to symbolize the plaintiff or its product in
the public mind.”).
76
E.g. Conan Properties, Inc. v. Conans Pizza, Inc., 752 Fed.2d 145 (5th
Cir. 1985); Am. Broad. Co. Merch., Inc. v. Button World Mfg., Inc., 1966 WL
7657 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966); Wyatt Earp Enters., Inc. v. Sackman, Inc., 157 F.
Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
77
Wyatt Earp, 157 F. Supp. at 623–625.
78
Id. at 624.
79
Id. at 627.
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court found that defendant’s use of the Wyatt Earp name on
children’s play costumes would very likely cause the consuming
public to believe that the costumes came from the plaintiff because
of the goodwill contributed to the Wyatt Earp name through the
plaintiff’s radio and television shows.80
In a case construing the related doctrine of unfair competition,
the court in Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox enjoined the defendants from
using any language that could be construed by the public as
suggesting a connection between defendant’s circus and the “Lone
Ranger” name.81 The court held that the Lone Ranger name was
the trade name under which plaintiff producers’ radio program was
distributed.82 Plaintiff had engendered good will in the Lone
Ranger name, and by using the title “the Original Lone Ranger” for
a performer in its circus—an obvious attempt to trade off
plaintiff’s good will in the Lone Ranger name—the defendants had
fraudulently appropriated that good will.83
Costumes worn by characters can also qualify for trademark
protection,84 and the unauthorized use of a character’s costume can
falsely suggest a connection between the unauthorized user and the
character owner.85 The issue in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v.
Pussycat Cinemas was whether the plaintiff owned a trademark in
the unique costumes worn by its cheerleaders.86 The court found
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80

Id. at 625.
Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 1942).
82
Id.
83
See id.; see also Button World Mfg. 1966 WL 7657 at *1 (enjoining
defendant from “using the very name which plaintiffs have popularized and
which is associated in the public mind with their broadcasting programs.”).
84
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d
200, 204 (2d Cir. 1979).
85
See Brown v. It’s Entm’t, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 854, 859 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)
(granting preliminary injunction against defendant renting infringing “Arthur the
Aardvark” costume); Warner Bros. Inc. v. Rooding, 1989 WL 76149 at *3-*4
(N.D. Ill. 1989).
86
Dallas Cowboys, 604 F.2d at 203–04.
81
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that plaintiff’s “combination of the white boots, white shorts, blue
blouse, and white star-studded vest and belt is an arbitrary design
which makes the otherwise functional uniform trademarkable.”87
In Warner Bros. Inc. v. Rooding, the court enjoined the owner of a
movie theater from jumping out of a helicopter wearing a Batman
costume on the day of the release of the Batman movie.88 The
timing and advertising for the stunt demonstrated to the court
defendant’s obvious intention to exploit plaintiff’s trademarks “in
the form of a Batman costume.”89 In Brown v. It’s Entertainment,
Inc., the plaintiff owners of the “Arthur the Aardvark” character
sought to enjoin the defendant’s unauthorized commercial use of
an unlicensed “Arthur” costume.90 The court found “Arthur,” a
stylized Aardvark with the persona of a schoolboy, to be an
inherently distinctive, and as the evidence showed, a famous
trademark.91
Other indicia, such as a prop, well-known saying, or slogan, of
a character can be protected by trademark if it is so connected to
the character so as to identify the character’s source.92 Bugs
Bunny’s “What’s up, doc?”93 and “E.T. phone home”94 are trademarks.
In Lone Ranger v. Cox, the court found defendant’s use of the
familiar call of plaintiff’s character—“Hi Ho Silver!”—in its circus
served to accentuate defendant’s deceptive use of the Lone Ranger
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87

Id. at 204.
Rooding, 1989 WL 76149 at *3; see also id. at *4 (explaining how the
injunction applied only to the defendant’s commercial use of the costume,
explicitly permitting him to wear it for “a walk down the beach . . . [h]anding
out free candy at orphanages . . . .”).
89
Id. at *3.
90
Brown v. It’s Entertainment, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 854 (E.D.N.Y 1999).
91
Id. at 858–59.
92
See supra note 75 (discussing protectability of an “ingredient” of an
entertainment product).
93
WHAT’S UP, DOC?, Registration No. 75,844,359.
94
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Kamar Indus., Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. 1162
(S.D. Tex. 1982).
88
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character.95 Holding that the familiar coloring and symbols on the
“General Lee” had attainted secondary meaning, the court in
Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys concluded that defendant’s unauthorized
toy cars were likely to confuse consumers into believing that the
infringing cars originated with the creators of the Dukes of
Hazzard.96
C. Distinctive Visual Representations Are Protectable by
Trademark Law.
Visual representations of characters are also protectable under
trademark law. For example, defendant’s chain of pizza restaurants
named “Conans Pizza,” and whose “menus, signs, promotional
materials, and general décor featured a barbarian-like man who
closely resembled” plaintiff’s “Conan the Barbarian” character was
found to have infringed the image of the trademarked character.97
At trial, the jury found it likely that “the pervasive, inescapable
aura of Conan the Barbarian” present at the restaurants could lead
consumers to conclude that the restaurants were associated with
the plaintiff owners of the “Conan the Barbarian” character.”98 In
DC Comics v. Filmation, the court compared defendant’s “Manta,”
“Moray,” and “Superstretch” characters to plaintiff’s “Aquaman”
and “Plastic Man” characters and found that the similarity of the
physical appearances and costumes of the defendant’s characters
were likely to cause confusion among consumers as to whether
such characters were associated with plaintiff, thereby
demonstrating trademark infringement and unfair competition.99
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95

Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650, 652 (4th Cir. 1942).
Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 333 (2d Cir. 1983).
97
Conan Properties, Inc. v. Conans Pizza, Inc., 752 F.2d 145, 148 (5th Cir.
1985); id. at 155 (holding that plaintiff owns protectable rights in the Conan the
Barbarian name and character).
98
Id. at 150.
99
See DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Assocs., 486 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
96
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D. General Traits Are Not Protected by Trademark
While a competitor’s use of an existing character’s distinctive
elements may cause confusion as to the source of the competing
character, the use of similar, common character traits will not. The
owner of a character will not be able to use trademark law to claim
exclusive rights in the general traits and abilities of its character,
just as it cannot use copyright law to claim exclusive rights in the
stock elements contained in the character.100 Because there are
infinite potential manifestations of personality traits and physical
abilities in a character, each can never be consistent enough to
serve as a single source identifier, and therefore cannot be
protected by trademark law.101 For example, in American
Greetings Corp. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc., the court found that in
selling its stuffed bears with messages displayed on their chests,
the defendant may have capitalized on the enhanced demand for
stuffed bears arising from the 75th anniversary of the teddy bear,
but it had not infringed on any trademark rights plaintiffs held in
their “Care Bears” stuffed bears which also bore symbols on their
chests.102
V. PROTECTION OF CHARACTERS THROUGH RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY
Separate from, and in addition to, copyrights and trademark
rights, the character persona adopted by an actor or other celebrity
may be protectable by rights of publicity.103 The right of publicity
gives a celebrity portraying a character or other famous persona the
right to control the exploitation of her “identity.”104 The “identity”
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100

Id. at 1277.
Id.
102
Am. Greetings Corp. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 607, 617
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
103
Although the case law typically involves the rights of publicity of
famous people, non-celebrities hold this property right as well.
104
See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835
(6th Cir. 1983). Note that most state laws provide rights of publicity for living
persons only. Some states do provide post-mortem rights of publicity. New York
101
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of a character or other persona may be a name, image, signature,
general appearance, or even voice. In Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., the
Ninth Circuit rejected the district court’s ruling that plaintiffs’
rights of publicity were not violated because no reasonable jury
could find that three dimensional robots resembling television
characters played by plaintiffs looked enough like plaintiffs to
violate their rights of publicity.105 The appeals court held that it
was the physical likenesses of the actors that had value to the
defendant, and regardless of plaintiff’s lack of copyright ownership
in the “Norm” and “Cliff” characters they played on television, a
reasonable trier of fact could conclude that defendant’s robots
appropriated the actors’ likenesses.106 Accordingly, the use of
likenesses of actors who portray copyrighted characters on
television may violate their rights of publicity and constitute false
endorsements if the resemblance is to the actors themselves, and
not just characteristics unique to the copyrighted characters that
they played.107
A celebrity’s identity can also include a signature saying, 108 his
name or nickname,109 or his car.110 These identity elements can be
misappropriated by a commercial user even without the use of the
celebrity’s likeness.111 An actor’s claim that his right of publicity
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
does not recognize a post-mortem right of publicity, but California provides
seventy years post-mortem right of publicity that is descendible and transferable.
Compare N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (Consol. 2000) with CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3344.1 (f)–(h) (2012).
105
Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1997).
106
Id. at 811 (stating actors do not lose the right to control the commercial
exploitation of their identities simply by portraying fictional characters).
107
Id. at 812.
108
See Carson v. Here’s Johnny, 698 F.2d at 832, 836 (“Here’s Johnny”).
109
See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 726–27 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (“the
Greatest”).
110
See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 822,
827 (9th Cir. 1974) (image of famous race car driver’s car with a solid red body
and a distinctive narrow white pinstripe on the leading edge).
111
See infra notes 142–44.
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has been violated by the commercialization, without his consent, of
the character he portrays will only lie if the accused character
evokes the persona of the actor.112 Where it is not an actual
person’s identity being exploited, but only the character he
portrays, it is likely there will be no violation of a right of
publicity.113
VI. LIMITATIONS ON EXCLUSIVE USE
Even if a person or entity owns copyrights and trademarks in a
character, there are limitations on that person or entity’s exclusive
use of the character. Not all uses of existing characters,
copyrightable elements, or character indicia infringe on any party’s
exclusive rights. Not only will the copyrightable elements of
characters all eventually enter the public domain after a limited
time, but all characters, even while still eligible for copyright
protection or entitled to trademark protection or protectable under
one’s right of publicity, may be used in new works in certain
circumstances without violating the rights of the character rights
holder. These exceptions to an owner’s monopoly over a character,
discussed below, ensure a proper balance between the exclusive
rights of character owners and the rights of the public and new
creators to use existing characters.
A. Non-infringing Uses—Copyright
It is typically the challenge of an infringement action that
determines whether a character is protected by copyright, and, if
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
112

See Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 624–25 (6th
Cir. 2000).
113
See id. at 625; accord Burck v. Mars, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 446, 454
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that while an M&M dressed as a naked cowboy in
Times Square evokes the character of the Naked Cowboy portrayed by Burck it
does not evoke Burck himself, and therefore does not violate New York’s right
of publicity law). Contra White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395,
1399 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding a robot that looks like Vanna White violated her
rights of publicity).
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so, whether copyright in that character has been infringed.114 The
court may examine the similarities between the specific aspects of
the characters in dispute,115 or between the totality of the
characters’ look and feel,116 or it may engage in combination of the
foregoing.117 Because stock character traits are not
copyrightable,118 some courts will distill the generic, unprotectable
elements from a character before making a comparison to an
allegedly infringing character.119
Under the “abstraction/filtration” test, even if a character is
original, its unique features must outweigh its stock characteristics
to withstand the scrutiny of a comparison of protectable elements
in an infringement action.120 Before the court compares the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
114

See 1–2 NIMMER, supra note 42, at § 2.12 (explaining that the
copyrightability of characters is “more properly framed as relating to the degree
of substantial similarity required to constitute infringement rather than in terms
of copyrightability per se”). But see Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate Ltd., 988 F.
Supp. 2d 879, 889 (N.D. Ill. 2013) aff’d, 755 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2013) (seeking
declaratory judgment); Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), vacated by 870 F.2d 40 (2d. Cir. 1989) (seeking declaratory judgment).
115
See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930)
(abstraction/filtration test).
116
See Sid & Marty Krofft, 562 F.2d 1157 at 1164 (extrinsic/intrinsic test).
117
See Hogan v. DC Comics, 48 F. Supp. 2d 298 at 309–10.
118
Walker v. Viacom Intern. Inc., 2008 WL 2050964, at *9 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (“the similarities between the two characters are limited to the stock
elements used to humanize a sponge”).
119
This method employs the “abstraction/filtration” test famously set forth
by Judge Hand in Nichols:
“Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number
of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as
more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps
be no more than the most general statement of what the play is
about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a
point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer
protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the
use of his ideas . . . .”
Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (internal quotation omitted).
120
See id. (discussing abstraction/filtration test).
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substantial similarity between two characters, it must first remove
from each character all unprotectable ideas and themes, so that it
can compare only the protectable components of each character.121
Even if one party’s character contains original stylistic choices,
those characteristics must be enhanced significantly to warrant
copyright protection after the unprotectable elements have been
filtered.122 In Mattel v. MGA, the court analyzed the substantial
similarity between defendants’ Bratz dolls, and the doll sketches
and sculptures owned by plaintiff.123 The appeals court held that
the district court’s filtration of unprotectable elements was
insufficient, and that it had erred by actually comparing similarities
between non-protectable ideas.124 Upon further filtering of themes
and ideas, the appeals court held that no reasonable trier of fact
could find the characters substantially similar if they were only
looking at the protectable expression.125
In determining whether one character infringes the copyright of
another, some courts not only look at the specific traits of each
character, but also consider the overall look and feel and the total
expression of character elements such as background story,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
121

See Blehm v. Jacobs, 702 F.3d 1193, 1200 (10th Cir. 2012); Mattel Inc.
v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 916 (9th Cir. 2010); Original Appalachian
Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 829 (11th Cir. 1982).
122
Blehm, 702 F.3d at 1200–01(stick figures engaging in commonplace
activities); Scholastic, Inc. v. Spiers, 28 F. Supp. 2d 862, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(skeleton wearing sneakers and a cap).
123
Mattel, 616 F.3d 904.
124
Id. at 916 (“[A plaintiff] can’t claim a monopoly over fashion dolls with
a bratty look or attitude, or dolls sporting trendy clothing—these are
unprotectable ideas.”); see also Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods. Div. of Gen.
Mills Fun Grp. Inc., 443 F. Supp. 291, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (“The defendants
have no more right to a monopoly in the theme of a black-robed, helmeted, evil
figure in outer-space conflict with a humanoid and a smaller non-humanoid
robot than Shakespeare would have had in the theme of a ‘riotous knight who
kept wassail to the discomfort of the household’ . . . .”) (quoting Nichols, 45
F.2d at 121).
125
See Mattel, 616 F.3d at 917.
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personality attributes, and interaction with other characters.126 In
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions v. McDonalds Corp.,
the defendant attempted to dissect each trait—clothing, colors,
mannerism, speech—comprising its character, and compare it to a
corresponding trait in the plaintiff’s character, to conclude that
because each individual trait was not exactly copied by its
character, there was no infringement.127 The court rejected this
argument, taking the position that the characters must be compared
with respect to the overall look and feel in the context of the works
in which they appear.128 In a case comparing the “Superman”
character to a character appearing in the episodic television show,
The Greatest American Hero, the Warner Bros., Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Cos. court articulated its rationale for comparing the
overall look and feel of the characters by distinguishing the
analysis of literary characters from visual characters.129 Unlike a
literary work, it reasoned, a graphic or three-dimensional work “is
created to be perceived as an entirety.”130 What the character
thinks, feels, says, and does, and the descriptions conveyed by the
author through the comments of other characters in the work
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
126

This method employs the “extrinsic/intrinsic test” set forth in Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Productions v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164
(9th Cir. 1977) (“The test for similarity of ideas is still a factual one, to be
decided by the trier of fact. . . . We shall call this the ‘extrinsic test.’ . . . The test
to be applied in determining whether there is substantial similarity in
expressions shall be labeled an intrinsic one depending on the response of the
ordinary reasonable person.”) (emphasis added).
127
Id. at 1166–67 (rebuking defendant’s analysis with “[w]e do not believe
that the ordinary reasonable person, let alone a child, viewing these works will
even notice that Pufnstuf is wearing a cummerbund while Mayor McCheese is
wearing a diplomat’s sash.”).
128
See id. at 1167. But see Am. Greetings Corp. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc.,
579 F. Supp. 607, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that defendant’s bears do not
appropriate the look and feel of plaintiff’s bears).
129
See Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 239–45 (2d
Cir. 1983).
130
Id. at 241.
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episodically, fill out a viewer’s understanding of the character.131
Noting that “[s]tirring one’s memory of a copyrighted character is
not the same as appearing to be substantially similar to that
character,” defendant’s “Hinkley” character, in the context of the
television show in which he appeared, was so different from
Superman that no infringement could be found.132 In Hogan v. DC
Comics, the court agreed with the defendant’s position that “the
works must share a similarity of expression, such as similarities of
treatment, details, scenes, events and characterization, or a
similarity in their ‘total concept and feel.’”133 The court found that
even though the main characters in both works had the same name,
the similarities between these characters were mostly unprotectable
ideas, such as their half-human/half-vampire genealogy, their
struggles with good and evil, and their “Generation X”
appearance.134 Furthermore, the total concept and feel of the
characters was not substantially similar, as they had very different
interactions and personalities.135A character owner cannot stop all
uses of traits that merely remind the public of the proprietary
character; only those instances where the traits used are
substantially similar to the protectable features of the proprietary
character.
B. Non-infringing Uses—Trademark
Trademark infringement involves the use of mark in a way that
is likely to confuse consumers as to the source or origin of a
product.136 Accordingly, where there is no substantial similarity
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
131

Id. at 241–42.
Id. at 243 (“The total perception of the Hinkley character is not
substantially similar to that of Superman. On the contrary, it is profoundly
different.”).
133
Hogan v. DC Comics, 48 F. Supp. 2d 298, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(citations omitted).
134
Id. at 310–12.
135
Id. at 312–13.
136
See, e.g., Conan Props., Inc. v. Conans Pizza, 752 F.2d 145, 148 (5th Cir.
1985); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 654 F.2d 204, 211 (2d. Cir.
132
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between an allegedly infringing character and a plaintiff’s
character from a copyright perspective, it is likely that potential
confusion under trademark law also will not be found.137 In
addition, trademarks can be used by others if the marks are not
being used as a source identifier. In the long-running case of
Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., the court ultimately held
that the use of the “Betty Boop” name in connection with the sale
of merchandise incorporating public domain images of that
character did not constitute trademark infringement because the
defendants’ use was a non-trademark use.138 Both the Ninth Circuit
and the district court on remand held that the use of the name by
the defendants was an aesthetically functional use, meaning that
consumers bought the Betty Boop merchandise because of the
decorative function of the “Betty Boop” name.139 The district court
reasoned that because the name was adapted from public domain
posters in a way that made it a “decorative component and part of
the aesthetic design of the defendant’s goods,” the purpose of the
use of the name was to look aesthetically pleasing to potential
customers, not to identify a source.140 On remand, the district court
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1981); Wyatt Earp Enters., Inc. v. Sackman, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 621, 626
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
137
Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Companies, 720 F.2d 231, 246
(2d Cir. 1983) (noting “[o]ur discussion of the differences in ‘total concept and
feel’ of the central characters of Superman and Hinkley applies to the issue of
likelihood of confusion as well as to copyright infringement.”); American
Greetings Corp. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
see also Harvey Cartoons v. Columbia Pictures Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1564
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding look and feel of plaintiff’s “Ghastly Trio” not
infringed by defendant’s “Ghostbusters” logo).
138
Fleischer Studios v. A.V.E.L.A., 925 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1074 (C.D. Cal.
2012) (“Fleischer II”).
139
Fleischer Studios v. A.V.E.L.A., 636 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir, 2011)
(“Fleischer I”); Fleischer II at 1067.
140
Fleischer II, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 1074. While Fleischer I was withdrawn
and superseded by Fleischer Studios v. A.V.E.L.A., 654 F.3d 958 (9th Cir.
2011) on remand, the district court in Fleischer II held defendants’ use of the
word mark was aesthetically functional.
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also held in the alternative that the defendants’ use of the “Betty
Boop” name on their products was fair use, because it was not
being used to identify the source of the goods, but merely to name
the character.141 The court reasoned that the manner in which the
defendants used the words was descriptive and therefore
“otherwise than as a mark” pursuant to the Lanham Act.142
To retain trademark rights in a character or its indicia, the
owner of the trademark must continue to use that trademark in
commerce. A character owner may therefore lose its exclusive
trademark rights in a character or any of that character’s indicia if
it abandons the mark.143 Pursuant to the Lanham Act, three years
of non-use of a trademark with “intent not to resume” use is prima
facie evidence of trademark abandonment.144 The burden is on the
alleged mark owner to produce evidence that it used the mark
during that time period, or that it intends to resume use.145 In Crash
Dummy Movie v. Mattel Inc, the court found that Mattel had met
its burden of demonstrating its intent to use its “Crash Dummies”
mark, despite three years of non-use, by providing evidence of
discussions with a prospective distributor, ongoing research and
development into future toys using the mark, and evidence of
shipments of sample toys for research and development
purposes.146 In contrast, the former owners of the “Amos ‘n’
Andy” mark were unable to overcome the presumption of
abandonment when they had not used the mark for over twenty
years, and could not show any intent to revive its use.147
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Fleischer II, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 1076.
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4)).
143
See Crash Dummy Movie, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 601 F.3d 1387 (Fed. Cir.
2010); Silverman v. CBS, 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1989).
144
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (“Nonuse [of a trademark] for 3 consecutive
years shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment.”).
145
Id.
146
Crash Dummy Movie, 601 F.3d at 1391.
147
Silverman, 870 F.2d at 48.
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It is important to keep in mind, however, that regardless of
whether confusion is likely, the owner of trademark elements of a
character can separately maintain an action for trademark dilution.
Trademark dilution can occur where a latter party’s use of a
character or character indicia is the same or so similar to a famous
mark already in use by another party that its use would dilute or
weaken the distinctive value of the senior user’s mark.148 For
example, in the “Arthur the Aardvark” costume case, the plaintiff
was entitled to the injunction because if the defendants used their
confusingly similar “Arthur” costume in connection with
“unwholesome causes, . . . the image sought by the plaintiffs for
Arthur will be difficult to control and might easily become blurred
or tarnished, resulting in a loss of credibility, public affection, and
consumer interest.149 In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Pussycat Cinemas, Ltd., the appeals court upheld the district
court’s injunction against defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s
trademarked cheerleader outfit on actors in its “sexually depraved”
film on the basis that such use tarnishes the Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders brand.150
C. Copyright Fair Use
The fair use doctrine, codified in the Copyright Act of 1976,
significantly limits character owners’ exclusive rights.151 A new
creator’s use of another’s character in a new work will not
constitute infringement if the use falls within the parameters of fair
use. Fair use protects free speech by permitting use of another’s
copyrighted work for “purposes such as criticism, comment, news
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
148

15 U.S.C. § 1125(C) (2012); see Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296
F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
149
See Brown v. It’s Entm’t, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 854, 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
150
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinemas, Ltd., 604 F.2d
200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979)
151
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268
F.3d 1257, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2001).
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reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research.”152 Courts engage
in a four-part inquiry to determine whether an unauthorized use of
another’s copyrighted work is a “fair use” and therefore not an
infringement.153 In recent years, some courts have put less
emphasis on the four-factor fair use analysis and focused instead
on whether the unauthorized use amounts to a “transformative”
use—that is, a use that gives new message or meaning to the work
used.154
A common scenario in which the court analyzes whether the
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s character is fair use occurs when
the defendant claims it used plaintiff’s character for the purpose of
parodying the character or the work in which it appeared.155 If a
defendant successfully parodies a character, the “purpose and
character of the use” is transformative and weighs heavily in favor
of fair use.156 In the parody context, one issue is whether the
defendant copied more than needed to “conjure up the original.”157
The more famous the character is, the less that is needed.158
Moreover, with visually represented characters, such as those in
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992).
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994);
Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607
F.3d 68, 73-74 (2d Cir. 2010); Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1268.
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See, e.g., Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1175–76 (9th Cir.
2013); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705–06 (2d Cir. 2013); Monge v. Maya
Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1171–74 (9th Cir. 2012).
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17 U.S.C. § 107; see, e.g., Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 256; Suntrust
Bank, 268 F.3d at 1268; Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 756
(9th Cir. 1978); see also Lyons P’ship v. Giannoulas, 179 F.3d 384, 388 (5th
Cir. 1999) (holding defendant’s use of plaintiff’s “Barney the Dinosaur”
character as a victim to its sports mascot was parody).
156
See, e.g., Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 256; Mattel, Inc. v. Walking
Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800–01 (9th Cir. 2003); Suntrust Bank, 268
F.3d at 1269.
157
Walt Disney Prods., 581 F.2d at 757.
158
See id. (recognizing that very little of the Mickey Mouse or Donald Duck
characters need be used in the parodic work in order to put those characters in
the viewer’s mind).
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comic books, very little is needed for an effective parody.159
Accordingly, in Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, defendant’s
near exact replications of “Mickey Mouse” and “Donald Duck”
constituted too much of a taking to warrant a fair use finding.160
In Salinger v. Colting, the defendant argued that his
appropriation of plaintiff’s Holden Caufield character was fair use
because his book was a parody of The Catcher in the Rye.161 The
court reasoned that merely rehashing the themes of plaintiff’s book
with an aged version of the book’s protagonist was insufficient to
demonstrate that the defendant had any intention to comment on or
criticize that book or that character.162 Recognizing that a parodist
must appropriate some amount of the existing work in order to
comment upon it, the court warned: “If . . . the commentary has no
critical bearing on the substance or style of the original
composition, which the alleged infringer merely uses to get
attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh,
the claim to fairness in borrowing from another’s work diminishes
accordingly (if it does not vanish). . . .”163 In United Feature v.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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See id.; see also Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Grp., Ltd., 182 F. Supp.
2d 897, 900–01 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (denying preliminary injunction against
defendant’s pornographic film parodying Star Wars).
160
Walt Disney Prods., 581 F.2d at 757; see also Walt Disney Prods. v. Air
Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108, 115 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (“It can scarcely be maintained
that there is no other means available to defendants to convey the message they
have, nor is it even clear that other means are not available within the chosen
genre of comics and cartoons.”).
161
See Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 F.3d
at 73 (2d Cir. 2010). The court did note that while a work need not be labeled a
parody to be treated as one, a defendant cannot “post hoc” seek to characterize
his potentially infringing work as a parody to avoid liability. Id. at 260 (citing
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 600 (1994)). There was evidence in this
case that prior to the commencement of the infringement action against him, the
defendant author had characterized his book as a sequel or tribute to The
Catcher in the Rye. Salinger, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 260 n.3.
162
Id. at 260.
163
Id. at 257 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581).
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Koons, the court held that Jeff Koons’ appropriation of plaintiff’s
“Odie” character was infringing.164 There the court reasoned that
defendant’s sculpture of “Odie” (from “Garfield”) was not an
effective parody because Koons admittedly selected the “Odie”
character arbitrarily, and not with the purpose of commenting on
the character itself—demonstrating that at best, the work was a
“parody of society at large . . .”165 Moreover, because the
defendant copied plaintiff’s “Odie” character in its entirety and
nearly identically, and he was found to have no motivation in
creating the Odie sculpture other than to sell it, the court rejected
Koons’ fair use defense.166
In contrast to Salinger v. Colting, the court in Suntrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co. held that the author of a book entitled The
Wind Done Gone made fair use of the classic novel, Gone with the
Wind.167 The defendant, publisher of The Wind Done Gone, argued
that it should not be enjoined from publishing the book because the
book was a fair use parody criticizing slavery, the Civil War-era
south, and the characters in Gone with the Wind.168 The court
analyzed the manner in which the author of The Wind Done Gone
used the characters from Gone with the Wind and concluded that
she made fair use of those characters.169 Applying the four factors
to the facts at bar, the court found: (1) the use was commercial in
the sense that it was written for-profit, but because it was highly
transformative, factor one weighed in favor of fair use;170 (2) Gone
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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United Feature Syndicate v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 384–85 (S.D.N.Y.

1993).
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Id. at 383–84.
See id. at 384.
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Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 628 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
168
Id.
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Id. at 1267–76 (11th Cir. 2001). But see Toho Co., Ltd. v. William
Morrow & Co., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1216–18 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (applying
the four factor test and concluding defendant’s use of stills of plaintiff’s
copyrighted Godzilla films in his compendium not fair use).
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Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1269–71.
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with the Wind was entitled to “the greatest degree of copyright
protection” as an original work of fiction;171 (3) the defendant took
a substantial portion of plaintiff’s characters but that alone was not
dispositive;172 and (4) the parodic nature of the defendant’s work
indicated that it would not act as a substitute for the plaintiff’s
work.173 For these reasons the court held that The Wind Done Gone
did not infringe Gone with the Wind.
Another fair use of a proprietary character was found in the
case of Mattel v. Walking Mountain.174 There, the defendant
photographer created and photographed scenes comprised of
“carefully positioned, nude, and sometimes frazzled looking
Barbies in often ridiculous and apparently dangerous situations.”175
Mattel sued him for, inter alia, copyright infringement. The
photographer argued that the purpose of his photographs was to
criticize society’s objectification of women, which was
exemplified by the popularity of the Barbie doll.176 After
addressing each of the fair use factors, the court concluded that the
defendant’s use of the Barbie character was fair use because: “(1)
his use was parody meant to criticize Barbie, (2) he only copied
what was necessary for his purpose, and (3) his photographs could
not affect the market for Mattel’s products. . . .”177 Even the use of
famous proprietary characters in their entirety will be permissible
where the use is fair pursuant to the Copyright Act.
D. Literary Works in the Public Domain
But characters will not remain proprietary forever. Characters,
like all copyrighted works, will be entitled to copyright protection
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Id. at 1271.
Id. at 1272–74.
173
Id. at 1275–76.
174
Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 806 (9th Cir.
2003).
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Id. at 802.
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See id. at 796.
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Id. at 800.
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only for the applicable term of copyright. Once the copyright in the
work in which a character appears expires—whether it be a book, a
play, a radio program, a movie or otherwise—that character, as
depicted in that work, enters the public domain. The extent to
which later published works featuring the same character include
further protectable development of the character will determine
whether and to what extent the owner retains exclusive right to use
the character. Where a character appears in a series of works over
time, inevitably, at some point, the earliest of the works will enter
the public domain while others remain protected by copyright. In
this situation, a character can exist in two or more incarnations,
some of which may enter the public domain, while others remain
protected. Courts have held that where an author has used a
character in a series of works, and any of those have entered the
public domain, anyone can use the story and character elements
from the works that have entered the public domain.178
In a case involving characters appearing in a radio series,
Silverman v. CBS, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that
the “Amos ‘n’ Andy” characters were in the public domain so he
could use them in his original musical.179 The court had to consider
the many appearances of “Amos ‘n’ Andy” over time, first via
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Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 988 F. Supp. 2d 879, 889 (N.D. Ill.
2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2013); see Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d
40 (2d Cir. 1989); Pannonia Farms, Inc. v. USA Cable, No. 03 Civ. 7841
(NRB), 2004 WL 1276842 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2004), aff’d in part, 426 F.3d 650
(2d Cir. 2005); see also Siegel v. Warner Bros Entm’t, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d
1048, 1059 (“Subsequent works in a series (or sequels) are in a sense derivative
works, while the characters which appear throughout the series are a part of the
underlying [initial] work upon which the later works are based . . . . So
copyright in a particular work in a series will not protect the character as
contained in such series if the work in the series in which the character first
appeared has entered the public domain[; instead,] protection for the character
extends only to those . . . elements added in [the sequel].”) (quoting 1 NIMMER,
supra note 42, at § 2.12 at 2–178.31 to –178.32).
179
Silverman, 870 F.2d at 42 (2d Cir. 1989).
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radio programs, and later on television.180 Because the facts
showed that the pre-1948 radio scripts—in which the characters
first appeared and were sufficiently delineated—had entered the
public domain, the court found that the “Amos ‘n’ Andy”
characters as they appeared in those pre-1948 scripts were in the
public domain.181 However, CBS still owned the increments of
original expression that appeared in the later, derivative works,
even if some of that original expression further developed the
characters.182 It was this later-created expression that Silverman
was precluded from using.183 Silverman was therefore allowed to
use the “Amos ‘n’ Andy” characters, so long as they didn’t display
any traits first appearing after 1948.184
Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate was another declaratory
judgment action by a plaintiff who desired to use characters
purportedly owned by the defendants in his original work.185
Sherlock Holmes and John Watson appeared in four novels and
fifty-six stories, only the last ten of which remained protected by
copyright at the time of the litigation.186 The author’s estate argued
that because the characters were developed throughout the entire
canon, including the last ten stories still protected by copyright, the
characters remained protected by the estate’s copyrights in those
last ten stories.187 Both the district court and the appeals court
rejected that argument, holding that the characters were delineated
upon their first appearance in the first novel, and that all
subsequent novels and stories containing the characters were
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See id. at 43.
Id. at 50.
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See id.
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See Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 988 F. Supp. 2d 879, 882 (N.D.
Ill. 2013).
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derivative works.188 Applying the “increments of expression”
doctrine to the derivative works, the Seventh Circuit did find,
however, that even though the characters themselves were in the
public domain, the estate still owned the original expression added
to the characters in those last ten stories, precluding Klinger’s use
of those elements.189
Thus, new creators can take characters from the public domain,
add new creative elements to those characters, and in effect bring
their versions of those characters to copyright life—as Universal
Pictures did with Mary Shelley’s “Frankenstein” and Bram
Stoker’s “Dracula,” and Disney did with the Brothers’ Grimm
“Snow White,” “Cinderella,” and “Rapunzel.” 190 The new creative
elements will be protected by copyright as long as they do not
infringe upon any creative elements that remain protected by
copyright by a prior user.191
E. Visual Images in the Public Domain
Another situation in which a character owner’s exclusive rights
may be tempered arises where a work that contains visual images
of that character has entered the public domain. In Warner
Brothers v. X one X Productions, the plaintiffs challenged the
defendant’s right to create and sell merchandise derived from
publicity shots and posters from the The Wizard of Oz and Gone
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See Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir.
2014) (“From the outset of the series of Arthur Conan Doyle stories and novels
that began in 1887 Holmes and Watson were distinctive characters and therefore
copyrightable.”).
189
Id. at 501.
190
See M.H. Segan Ltd. Partnership v. Hasbro, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 512
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (accepting as true that MCA/Universal Merchandising, Inc.
owns the copyright in the visual image of the Frankenstein character); see also
Sleeping Beauty, The Little Mermaid, Aladdin, and Pinocchio.
191
Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d 584, 586 (8th
Cir. 2011). (“[T]his freedom to make new works based on public domain
materials ends where the resulting derivative work comes into conflict with a
valid copyright.”).
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with the Wind films.192 The defendant argued that because its
merchandise used only public domain images, as opposed to stills
from the actual films, it was not infringing on the plaintiff’s
copyrights in the films.193 The posters and still images were in the
public domain because they were published without complying
with then-required copyright formalities such as including
copyright notice or filing copyright renewals.194 Analyzing the
attributes of the characters in the public domain publicity
materials, and those embodied by the films, the court reasoned that
because the publicity materials “reveal[ed] nothing of each film
character’s signature traits or mannerisms,”195 and because “the
characters’ visual appearances in the publicity materials for The
Wizard of Oz do not present the requisite consistency to establish
any ‘copyrightable elements’ of the film characters’ visual
appearances,” even if those images were in the public domain, the
characters in the films were not.196 Therefore, the defendant was
only permitted to faithfully reproduce the public domain images on
merchandise because those particular images, in contrast to the
characters depicted in those images, were in the public domain.
The defendant was precluded from extracting the images of the
characters from the public domain works in which they appeared
and creating new composite works featuring the characters and
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Id. at 584.
See id. at 596.
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See id. at 597–98.
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Id. at 599.
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Id. at 602 (“[A]lthough the derivative work may enter the public domain,
the matter contained therein which derives from a work still covered by statutory
copyright is not dedicated to the public. The established doctrine prevents
unauthorized copying or other infringing use of the underlying work or any part
of that work contained in the derivative product so long as the underlying work
itself remains copyrighted.”) (quoting Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th
Cir. 1979)); see also Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., 772 F. Supp. 2d
1135, 1148 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“[E]ven if the poster did fall into the public
domain as a result of the lack of a copyright notice, the original Betty Boop
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their famous maxims (such as “There’s no place like home”),
because such new composite works would “evoke the film
character in a way the individual items of public domain material
did not,” even if each composite work was “composed entirely of
faithful extracts from public domain materials.”197 The
combination of the images and aphorisms, the court held, added
the increments of expression required to infringe upon the more
developed film characters.198
In contrast to the above-cited cases in which the seminal works
embodying the character remained protected by copyright, the
purported owners of the “Fatso” the ghost character (a friend of
“Casper the Friendly Ghost”) were unable to sustain a copyright
infringement claim against the producers of the Ghostbusters film
for use of a ghost image in their marketing, because the early
“Casper” cartoons in which “Fatso” appeared had entered the
public domain.199 Because “Fatso” appeared in later “Casper”
episodes identical to the way he appeared in public domain
episodes, he had entered the public domain when those early
episodes did.200
The fact that the copyright in a visual image of character has
fallen into the public domain does not mean that the character, or
elements of the character, may not still function as a trademark.201
For instance, the plaintiff in Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales,
Inc. conceded that the pictures on the covers of the books that were
the subject of the litigation were in the public domain, but argued
that those same illustrations had acquired secondary meaning and
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Warner Bros., 644 F.3d at 602–03.
Id. at 600.
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Harvey Cartoons v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 1564,
1570 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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See id.
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See, e.g., Tri-star Pictures, Inc. v. Del Taco, Inc., 1999 WL 33260839
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functioned as trademarks.202 Noting that copyright law and
trademark law were not mutually exclusive means to protect a
character, the court in Warne held that even if the illustrations had
fallen into the public domain, an illustration could be protected by
trademark law “so long as it is shown to have acquired
independent trademark significance, identifying in some way the
source or sponsorship of the goods.”203 It is on this same basis that
the producer of the 1998 The Mask of Zorro movie was able to
assert its trademark rights in the Zorro character to prevent a
restaurant chain from adopting Zorro indicia in an advertising
campaign.204
F. The First Amendment
Free speech rights will allow the use of another’s trademark in
the title of a creative work where the mark is used for creative
expression and not primarily for a commercial purpose.205 In a case
whose rule has been adopted by the Ninth Circuit and applied to
character cases, the Second Circuit in Rogers v. Grimaldi held
there was no Lanham Act violation for false designation of origin
where the defendant filmmaker used the famous plaintiff’s name in
the title of his film, Ginger and Fred.206 With respect to this type
of use of a mark or persona, the defendant’s freedom of expression
outweighed the plaintiff’s concern that the title would mislead
consumers.207 Adopting the Second Circuit’s “Rogers test” in
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See Frederick, 481 F. Supp. at 1193.
Id. at 1196. In this case, however, plaintiff had not provided sufficient
evidence of this claim to be granted summary judgment of the issue. Id. at 1198.
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See Tri-star, at *3.
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Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 997 (2d Cir. 1989). See also
Silverman, 870 F.2d at 48; Toho Co., Ltd. v. William Morrow & Co. 33 F. Supp.
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book).
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Mattel v. MCA, Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit upheld the
district court’s ruling that the band Aqua’s song “Barbie Girl” did
not infringe Mattel’s trademark rights in the Barbie name.208
Cautioning that “the trademark owner does not have the right to
control public discourse whenever the public imbues his mark with
a meaning beyond its source-identifying function,”209 the court
held that using the Barbie trademark in a song making fun of the
values Barbie represents was artistically relevant and did not
suggest that the song was sponsored by Mattel.210 When Mattel
returned to the same court shortly thereafter in Mattel v. Walking
Mountain for the same First Amendment reasons, the court easily
found that the defendant’s use of the Barbie name in the titles of
his photographs depicting Barbies was artistic expression
accurately describing the subject of the photos and not suggesting
that Mattel was in any way connected to the photographs.211
Similarly, claims for violations of rights of publicity may be
rejected on First Amendment grounds. For example, the
“transformative test” articulated in Comedy III Productions v.
Gary Saderup, sets forth the rule that where a depiction of a
celebrity is significantly transformed by the addition of increments
of expression to his mere likeness, no violation of his right to
publicity will occur, and the user’s First Amendment rights will be
maintained.212 In that case, the court averred that whether the use
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the marketplace—a trademark owner’s property rights play well with the First
Amendment.”).
208
296 F.3d at 909 (“I’m a Barbie girl, in my Barbie world; Life in plastic,
it’s fantastic.”).
209
Id. at 900.
210
Id. at 902.
211
353 F.3d. 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003).
212
21 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001); see No Doubt v. Activision Publishing,
Inc., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d 1728, 1740 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (holding Avatars
representing the band No Doubt in Activision’s game did not meet the
transformative-use test because the avatars were simply “precise computergenerated reproductions of the band members” which did not “meld with the
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of celebrities’ likenesses (in this case, the “Three Stooges” on tshirts) violates their rights of publicity or is protected First
Amendment expression depends upon “whether the celebrities’
likenesses are used as one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an
original work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation
of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in
question.”213 The analysis thus turns on whether a product
containing a celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has
become primarily the defendant’s own expression rather than the
celebrity’s likeness.
Accordingly, the court in Edgar Winter v. DC Comics held that
use of celebrities’ likenesses as some of the raw materials
comprising a comic book story does not violate the celebrities’
rights of publicity where the depictions are transformative—that is,
where the depictions contain significant expressive content other
than the celebrities’ mere likenesses.214 The expressive content in
that case included use of the likenesses in a larger story, which
itself was quite expressive, as well as distortion, lampooning,
parody, and caricature.215
Rejecting the “transformative test,” the court in Doe v.
MacFarlane adopted a “predominant use test” when balancing a
celebrity’s right of publicity against freedom of speech rights.216
Notwithstanding the expressiveness of the use of the identity, if a
product is sold that predominantly exploits the commercial value
of an individual’s identity, that product should be held to violate
the right of publicity and not be protected by the First Amendment,
even if there is some “expressive” content in it that might qualify
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
other elements of the game to become . . . Activision’s own artistic
expression.”).
213
Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 809.
214
69 P.3d 473, 479 (Cal. 2003).
215
See id.
216
207 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
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as “speech.”217 If, on the other hand, the predominant purpose of
the product is to make an expressive comment on or about a
celebrity, the expressive additions could be given greater weight.218
In Doe v. MacFarlane, the court held that the use of the name
“Tony Twist,” a former professional hockey player, as the name of
a mobster in a comic book series violated the player’s right of
publicity because the evidence demonstrated that the predominant
use of Twist’s name was to sell comic books and appeal to hockey
fans.219
VII. CONCLUSION
Trademark, copyright, and rights of publicity laws encourage
authors to conceive and develop original fictional characters and
offer them to the public to enjoy in various forms of media and
merchandise. The laws also protect the public and other authors by
denying the creators and owners of original characters the ability to
maintain monopolies over their characters by limiting the scope of
exclusive protection available to characters.
Understanding what makes characters protectable will provide
an author the opportunity to conceive and develop characters in a
way that will enhance their protectability. Fully fleshing out one’s
characters by including distinctive tangible and intangible traits—
including physical appearance; clothing or (if applicable) costume;
personality traits; powers; habits; manner of speech; origin and
background story; interaction and relationships with other
characters; and settings in which the character exists—will all
increase the scope of protection afforded to such character under
copyright whether in literary or visual imagery or both.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Id. at 57 (quoting Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo.

2003)).
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See id. at 61.
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Giving a character a distinctive and memorable name and using
that name in or as a series title and otherwise for the branding of
publications, media productions, and merchandise will help the
character creator establish trademark rights in the character name.
This also applies to symbols, emblems, slogans, and visual
imagery of or elements associated with the character. To establish
and maintain trademark rights in elements associated with one’s
character, it is important to use those elements in a consistent
manner. Character creators seeking to further their rights in their
characters may secure trademark registrations and domain names
based on their characters’ names, and terms or slogans associated
with their characters. But while trademark law rewards the entity
that expended the time and money to develop a character so that
the consuming public identifies it with that entity, those exclusive
rights are subject to limitations. Character marks must be
consistently used in commerce, and trademark rights cannot be
used to prevent others from using characters that have fallen into
the public domain, so long as the latter users of such characters use
them in a manner that will not confuse the public as to the source
of the latter users’ works.
Notwithstanding the effort devoted to creating a protectable
character, authors and their successors in interest should
understand, however, that eventually the copyright in an original
character will expire, thereby dedicating even a highly delineated
and unique character to the public after some period of time. A
character owner can keep a character fresh and alive by adding
updates to keep the character current with the time, adding new
traits, modifying the character’s appearance, and introducing new
supporting characters and elements. So, while the earliest versions
of a character may enter the public domain, the original character
owner or successor thereto can maintain itself in the public eye as
the source of the official version of character.
Allowing creators and their assignees to exploit their characters
through copyright, trademark, and right of publicity on an
exclusive basis—subject to certain limited exceptions—encourages
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authors, artists, and performers to add to the culture that benefits
all of society. By giving character owners confidence that others
cannot unfairly trade off their original work and the good will they
have generated in connection with their characters, character
owners will be encouraged to spend time and money developing
the public’s favorite characters. If so incentivized, the owners will
invest in producing more entertainment products containing those
characters for the public to enjoy. Exclusive rights in characters
also benefit the public in that encouraging owners to produce more
character entertainment products ensures that the owners will
maintain the quality of the entertainment product, continuing to
meet consumers’ high expectations for the products.
The exceptions to exclusive use discussed above put reasonable
limitations on a character owner’s monopoly over a piece of our
collective culture. Trademark law will only protect a character for
so long as the owner is using the mark in commerce. Therefore, in
order to maintain such exclusivity, owners must provide the public
with entertainment products containing those characters. If an
owner does abandon its trademark rights in a character, then any
member of the public has a right to use whatever previously
trademark-protected elements of the character they desire to keep
the character alive. When the copyright in a character expires, any
member of the public has the right to create original works using
that character. If such a second comer desires to establish exclusive
rights in a new version of the character, the second comer must add
original creativity to the public domain character. This, in turn,
will benefit the public by advancing the number and variety of
works generated for public enjoyment. In addition, the First
Amendment keeps character owners from extending their
monopolies unconstitutionally by restricting owners from
controlling public discourse, even when their proprietary
characters are used. A robust public discourse is also encouraged
by the allowance for use of protected characters for purposes such
as parody and criticism. In these ways, the law endeavors to
balance the exclusivity that owners deserve for adding desirable
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characters to our shared culture, with the societal goals of
encouraging the dissemination of creative works and public
discourse by using culturally relevant characters in new works.

